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Summary
The success of a federal arrangement in accommodating ethnic diversity 
cannot be measured solely on the basis of its language rights regime. 
However, it is generally agreed that a well-designed language rights regime 
goes a long way in contributing either to the effective reconciliation, unity 
and diversity or to the eventual polarisation of cultural communities. This 
article focuses on the challenges of adopting an inclusive language policy 
in multi-lingual states. Using two case studies, South Africa and Ethiopia, 
it examines the different policy alternatives for accommodating linguistic 
communities.
1 Introduction
As language is often one of the key expressions of ethnic identity, lan-
guage rights in a federal state are ‘invested with a symbolism of its 
own’.1 It represents the recognition (or the lack thereof) of the lin-
guistic identities of the state’s constituent units. As a result, a language 
policy often correlates with visions of uniformity or visions of diversity.
Of course, language policies go beyond the symbolic realm of 
recognition. The recognition and protection of language rights and 
linguistic identity form an important part of human rights. This asser-
tion may, of course, appear at odds with the individual liberal position 
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that provides the theoretical foundation for most international human 
rights instruments, including the United Nations (UN) Charter2 and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration).3 
Major international documents, other than providing for a right against 
discrimination (based on language), do not mention group-specific 
rights.4 The widely-recognised language rights in the context of ‘fair 
trail and the due process of law’ are similarly informed by this same 
individualist philosophy.5
Notwithstanding this individualistic orientation, the human rights 
instruments that impact language rights, either as part of a non-dis-
crimination clause or through other specific rights, affect the power 
of the state in areas of language policy. In other words, the protection 
of many of the rights recognised in international human rights instru-
ments has implications for states’ language policies. This is because a 
language policy has the capacity to affect the enjoyment of other rights. 
A language policy that only promotes a single language group can 
have the effect of discrimination as it can create barriers to the exercise 
of voting, education and other rights.6 As noted by De Varennes:7
If public authorities prevent the use of any language, including minority 
language, in private activities, this could potentially, depending on the 
type of intervention, breach a number of rights such as the right to private 
and family life, freedom of expression, non-discrimination, or the right of 
persons belonging to a linguistic minority to use their language with other 
members of their group.
2 The Charter makes no reference to group-specific rights. It simply recognises indi-
vidual rights. This individualist outlook is, in fact, made clear in the opening article, 
art 1(3), which outlines the purpose of the UN. According to this article, one of the 
purposes of the UN is to encourage ‘respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion’. The refer-
ence to ‘fundamental freedoms for all’ is interpreted to mean fundamental freedom 
for all individuals and not groups.
3 The Universal Declaration declares that ‘everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as … 
language’.
4 In addition to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration, art 1 of the UNESCO 
Convention against Discrimination in Education of 1960, arts 2(1) and 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 2(2) of the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art 1 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights, and art 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
provide for the right against discrimination on grounds of language.
5 According to arts 14(3)(a) & (f) of ICCPR, an accused has the right to be ‘informed 
promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause 
of the charge against him’; and is to have ‘the free assistance of an interpreter if he 
cannot understand or speak the languages used in court’. Similar rights are provided 
in arts 5(2) and 6(3)(a) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and art 8 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights.
6 R Dunbar ‘Minority language rights in international law’ (2001) 50 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 90-120.
7 F de Varennes ‘Linguistic identity and language rights’ in M Weller (ed) Universal 
minority rights (2007) 258.
A more controversial category of rights are language rights that mandate 
the use of different languages by public authorities. These language 
rights, which are also the major focus of this contribution, provide 
individuals what the principle of non-discrimination cannot provide, 
namely, the right to obtain government services through the medium 
of one’s language. It is also these language rights that are relevant to 
the linguistic identity of minorities. Except for the widely-recognised 
right to use a minority language when required for the purposes of 
a fair trail and due process, however, most human rights treaties say 
very little about the use of language by state authorities. Even article 
27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
which attempts to address language-related claims, makes reference 
only to persons belonging to ‘such minorities’ and not to the groups 
themselves:
In those states in which ethnic or linguistic minorities exist, persons belong-
ing to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, or to use their own language.
This means that the right recognised by article 27 is an individual right 
that, in so far as language rights are concerned, only protects the use of 
a language as between private individuals.8 The only two instruments 
that clearly impact on the use of a minority language by state authorities 
are the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities 
and the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages, both 
of which are regional instruments.9 These two instruments provide 
for the so-called ‘sliding-scale approach’, which requires that10
[w]here public authorities at the national, regional or local level face a suffi-
ciently large number of individuals who use a minority language, authorities 
must provide an appropriate level of services in this language.
8 B Bowring ‘Multi-cultural citizenship: A more viable framework for minority rights?’ 
in D Fottrell & B Bowring (eds) Minority and group rights in the new millennium (1999) 
6-9. See also De Varennes (n 7 above) 298.
9 Art 10(2) of the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities 
provides that ‘[i]n areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities tra-
ditionally or in substantial numbers, if those persons so request and where such 
a request corresponds to a real need, the parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far 
as possible, the conditions which would make it possible to use the minority lan-
guage in relations between those persons and the administrative authorities’. Similar 
rights are provided in art 10 of the European Charter on Regional and Minority 
Languages. 
10 De Varennes (n 7 above) 298. Other major international instruments that make refer-
ence to language rights, though not always in legally-binding form, include the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities; the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action; the European Charter for Regional 
and Minority Languages; the Central European Initiative Instrument for the Protec-
tion of Minority Rights; and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities.
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The absence of general human rights treaties that contain provisions 
on the use of language by state authorities begs the issue of states’ 
response to the use of language for the purposes of government. That 
is exactly what this contribution intends to address. It focuses on the 
challenges of adopting an inclusive language policy in multi-lingual 
states. Using two case studies, those of South Africa and Ethiopia, it 
examines the different policy alternatives for accommodating linguistic 
communities. It does this in four separate but interrelated parts. First, it 
discusses the two major language policies that are adopted by countries 
that are charcterised by linguistic diversity. It then proceeds to exam-
ine the South African constitutional approach to language rights. This 
is followed by an examination of the Ethiopian approach. The article 
concludes by bringing together the discussion on the experience of 
the two multi-linguistic states and identifying some of the key lessons, 
which may also assist other multi-linguistic states that are struggling 
with the similar challenges of adopting an inclusive language policy.
This contribution is decidedly narrow in its approach as it deals with 
the specific subject of language use by state authorities. This choice 
is informed by the purpose of the article, namely examining the rel-
evance of language rights regimes to a state that seeks to respond to 
the exigencies of linguistic diversity. Issues of discrimination based on 
language and other aspects of language rights are not the focus of the 
article. These and other issues, like language in education policy, are 
discussed only to the extent that they are relevant to make a point to 
the main thesis of this article.
2 Brief comparative overview of language rights 
regimes
Multi-ethnic states adopt different language policies. Some adopt a 
policy modelled on the individualistic approach, or commonly known 
as the personality principle, to the whole issue of language rights, 
while others opt for a territorial model of language planning. Under 
the territorial approach, the rights to exercise language rights are con-
fined within the defined territory of the minority language. Under the 
personality principle, by contrast, an individual speaker can, by and 
large, exercise language rights irrespective of his or her geographical 
location. As noted by Reaume:11
Neither model [of language policy] dictates very precisely a concrete lan-
guage policy on language, and indeed the literature displays a distinct lack 
of precision in the use of the two models to illuminate the concrete polices 
adopted in various jurisdictions.
11 DG Reaume ‘Beyond personality: The territorial and personal principles of language 
policy reconsidered’ in W Kymlicka & A Patten (eds) Language rights and political 
theory (2003) 271.
The aim of this brief comparative overview is, however, simply to place 
the discussion on language polices in Ethiopia and South Africa in a 
broader context, by indicating the general trend in countries facing 
similar challenges. For the purpose of this article, we will stick to the 
dichotomy of the personality and territorial principle as commonly 
understood.
2.1 Personality model
According to the personality principle, individuals are entitled to use 
their mother tongue in every part of the country with few territo-
rial restrictions. This vests individuals with a right in their personal 
capacity, regardless of where they live. In other words, the linguistic 
preferences of speakers, wherever they reside, are given a central 
place in the regulation of language use. An important element of this 
principle is, however, the criterion ‘where numbers warrant’, which 
implies that ‘language rights may be granted only when there are [a] 
sufficient number of particular language speakers to warrant language 
protection’.
The language policy adopted by Canada represents this approach. 
Under the Official Languages Act, passed in 1969, both French and 
English were granted official status for all purposes of the federal 
government.12 As a result of these language rights, which were later 
included in the 1982 constitutionally-entrenched Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Canadian citizens are entitled to federal government services 
in either official language where there is a significant demand. Further-
more, the Constitution provides all Canadian citizens, where numbers 
warrant, the right to have their children educated at elementary and 
secondary levels in either official language. This policy entailed a sym-
metrical application from coast to coast, whereby French-speaking 
minorities outside Quebec and the English-speaking minority inside 
Quebec receive equal constitutional protection.13
The language policy adopted by Canada, which is designed as a 
means to achieve a nation-building objective, aims to separate linguis-
tic differences from the collectivities, territories and institutions which 
constitute them. Although the predominantly French-speaking Que-
bec province, like the rest of the provinces in Canada, can adopt its 
own language policy, the application of the federal official languages 
policy, which is based on the personality principle, means that Que-
12 GM Balmer ‘Does the United States need an official language? The examples of Bel-
gium and Canada’ (1992) 2 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 445.
13 Balmer (n 12 above) 446.
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bec has achieved only limited territorialism.14 In fact, as Rubio-Marin 
indicates15
‘[t]he Charter has de-territorialized language rights by attaching them to 
speakers of both French and English rather than to provinces, recognizing 
thereby minority status to both the Francophone minorities outside Quebec 
and the Anglophone minority inside Quebec.
In this regard, the personality approach represents a reluctance to 
recognise the Francophone community as a territorialised linguistic 
community.16 The ‘de-territorialisation’ role of language rights in pro-
moting a monist vision of the Canadian state and rejecting the idea of 
a territorialised nation within the state of Canada is also evident in the 
following remarks of Pierre Trudeau, one of Canada’s most influential 
Prime Ministers, also known for his view of pan-Canadianism:17
If minority language rights are entrenched throughout Canada, then the 
French-Canadian nation would stretch from Maillardville in BC to the Acadia 
community on the Atlantic Coast … Quebec cannot say it alone speaks for 
French-Canadians.
A common criticism directed against the personality approach is that 
it has the tendency to perpetuate the dominant position that a histori-
cally privileged language group enjoys in the state. It is likely to have 
the effect of strengthening the pressures for assimilation to the domi-
nant group.18 This is illustrated by (the fact that the secondary status 
of French has not changed with the adoption of the policy of official 
14 M Chevrier ‘Language policy for a language in exile’ in P Larrivee (ed) Linguistic 
conflict and language laws: Understanding the Quebec question (2003) 155.
15 R Rubio-Marin ‘Language rights: Exploring the competing rationales’ in Kymlicka & 
Patten (n 11 above) 60.
16 Quebec has continuously been demanding to be recognised as a ‘distinct society’ in 
Canada. This was the main agenda in the two rounds of constitutional negotiations: 
the Meech Lake Accord in 1978 and the Charlottetown Accord in 1990. Recogni-
tion of Quebec as a ‘distinct society’ would have affirmed Quebec’s dualist vision of 
the state, though set out only in the unenforceable paragraphs of a constitutional 
Preamble. The Quebec government’s demand to be recognised as a ‘distinct society’ 
has not been successful. See S Tierney Constitutional law and national pluralism 
(2004) 238; see also R Simeon & L Turgeon ‘Federalism, nationalism and regionalism 
in Canada’ (2006) 3 Revista d’Estudis Autonomics I Federals 12. Gagnon & Herivault 
argue that the outcome of the Meech Lake debate has made the ‘distinct society’ 
compromise obsolete and no longer good enough to a majority of Quebecoise. 
For them, the only acceptable form of recognition today would be the inclusion 
of a clause recognising the ‘Quebec nation’ in the Preamble of the Canadian Con-
stitution; A Gagnon & J Herivault ‘The unresolved recognition of Quebec’ paper 
delivered at a colloquium on Separatism in Canada: Past, present and future’, Insti-
tute of Commonwealth Studies/Institute for the Study of the Americas, University of 
London, London, 4 November 2005 http//www.cst.ed.ac.ut/document (accessed 
20 September 2009).
17 D Karmis & AG Gagnon ‘Federalism, federation and collective identities in Canada 
and Belgium: Different routes, similar fragmentation’ in J Tully & A Gagnon (eds) 
Multi-national democracies (2001) 154-155.
18 Karmis & Gagnon (n 17 above) 155.
bilingualism) the secondary status of French in Quebec even long after 
the adoption of the policy of official bilingualism. In Quebec, the cul-
tural division of labour was such that ‘capital spoke English and labour 
spoke French’, thus resulting in English occupying a disproportion-
ate place in Quebec in relation to French,19 that in a way encouraged 
people from the other group to assimilate to that language group, 
thus resulting in providing a disproportionate place to the historically 
dominant group.20 Thus, despite the application of the federal policy 
of bilingualism, English continued to remain as the majority status 
language with French relegated to a secondary level. That prompted 
Quebec to embark upon what is often called ‘the language normali-
sation process’, the adoption of a series of language policies that are 
aimed at elevating the status of French within the province by reversing 
the disproportionate place it occupies in its own province.21 As noted 
by Gagnon,22
[t]he decision on the part of the Quebec government to implement a series 
of laws to redress past practices created bad feelings outside Quebec, since 
it was felt that the federal policy of bilingualism had responded to Quebec’s 
demands.
As the foregoing discussion shows, the personality approach to 
language planning follows a non-exclusive approach and allows 
19 See Balmer (n 12 above) 446. See also Coulombe (n 1 above) 248.
20 The Commissioner of Official Languages, in his 1995 Report, noted this fact. The 
Report concluded that French still had a disproportionate place in relation to 
English, even in the federal administration where progress in the use and status of 
French is more visible. The Commissioner concluded that French did not achieve 
‘a fair status as a language of services and work’. The 1996 Census also revealed 
that ‘the historical pattern of assimilation among francophone minorities has not yet 
been overcome’; Karmis & Gagnon (n 17 above) 155. 
21 The Charter of the French Language in Quebec, which is famously known as Bill 
101, is a good example that illustrates this situation. Adopted by the Parti Quebecois 
government in 1977, Bill 101, following the territorial model of language planning, 
sought to promote the use of French and at the same time restrict the use of English. 
It obliges both immigrants and Canadians moving to Quebec to send their children 
to a French school and mandated the display of commercial signs in French only. 
The court decision abrogated part of this legislation. The Supreme Court in 1979 
decided that provisions making French the only official language of legislation and 
justice violate sec 133 of the British North America Act, 1867, which guarantees 
legislative and judicial bilingualism in Quebec. Part of the law that restricted the 
rights to education in English was struck down, entitling not only people who had 
been educated or whose parents had been educated in English in Quebec, but also 
those who had been educated in English elsewhere in Canada, to have their children 
receive education in that language. The Court in 1988 also struck down the rule that 
imposes French as the only language to be used on commercial signs. See gener-
ally K Swinton ‘Federalism, the Charter and the courts: Rethinking constitutional 
dialogue in Canada’ in K Knopf et al (eds) Rethinking federalism: Citizens, markets 
and governments in a changing world (1995) 294-315. See generally J Tully Strange 
multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of diversity (1995) 175.
22 A-G Gagnon ‘Manufacturing antagonisms: The move towards uniform federalism in 
Canada’ in B de Villiers Evaluating federal systems (1994) 127.
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individuals to use the language of their preference across the country. 
In short, the personality approach emphasises an individualistic orien-
tation of the right. In such a vision, linguistic differences are individual 
attributes, protected from ‘coast to coast’ by a central state. The major 
characteristic of this model of language policy is that it, with its integral 
coast-to-coast bilingualism, forms part of Canada’s failure to extend 
a symbolical recognition of its multi-national character, presenting a 
monist vision of the state in the symbolic realm.23 It regards the state 
as one bi/multi-lingual nation. Although the personality principle may 
be feasible in a country like Canada where there are few linguistic com-
munities, the capacity of this approach to give practical effect to the act 
of recognition in a multi-ethnic context is questionable. As indicated 
earlier, the tendency of this particular language policy to perpetuate 
the dominant position of a historically dominant language is also 
something that must be looked into. Without a deliberate interven-
tion from the state or the constituent government, it is likely that the 
historically dominant language group will continue to remain as the 
majority status language with the languages of other groups relegated 
to a secondary level.
2.2 Territorial model
Other states have responded to the language problem by adopting 
the territorial model of language planning. Under such systems, the 
official language would often be that of the majority of the locality. 
Individuals have a right to services in that language only, regardless 
of what their mother tongue is. This often has the effect of promoting 
unilingualism although ‘the connection between the territorial dimen-
sion of language policy and unilingualism is not a logical one’.
A good example of the territorial model is Belgium, where both 
French-speaking Flanders and Dutch-speaking Walloon endorse uni-
lingualism with Brussels being the only region that has adopted official 
bilingualism. Individuals moving into the other parts of Belgium must 
assimilate. French-speaking Belgians moving to a Flanders territory will 
have to send their children to Flanders schools and vice versa. There is 
thus a strict policy of both territorial and individual monolingualism, 
implying that ‘[t]here are no all Belgian language rights’.24 Similarly, 
in Switzerland, language guarantees are provided on the basis of the 
principle of territoriality. German-speaking Swiss moving to a French-
speaking canton has to leave behind any prior claim to language 
protection.25
23 Simeon & Turgeon (n 16 above) 27. See also Karmis & Gagnon (n 17 above) 152.
24 M Keating Plurinational democracy: Stateless nations in a post–sovereignty era (2001) 
128.
25 T Fleiner ‘Switzerland: Constitution of the Federal State and the Cantons’ in L Basta-
Fleiner & T Fleiner (eds) Federalism and multi-ethnic states: The case of Switzerland 
(2000) 103-145. 
The territorial model of language policy represents a recognition of 
the linguistic identities of the constituent units. It also provides ample 
room for a community to develop its language and culture. Of course, 
the territorial model of language planning is not without problems. 
One of the palpable consequences of the territorial model in Switzer-
land is that ‘many Swiss do not actually become multilingual’.26 There 
is also a concern that this particular approach risks developing isolated 
communities and scores low in the promotion of inter-group solidarity. 
That might explain the description of Switzerland as a country com-
posed of three groups that ‘stand with their backs to each other’.27 It 
must, however, be admitted that, under certain circumstances, such a 
language policy might be the only way to hold the state together. In 
the case of Belgium, for example, it is argued that Belgium would not 
have existed as one state today had such an arrangement not been 
made.28 In Switzerland, too, the territoriality principle to language is 
considered to be instrumental in guaranteeing peace among the dif-
ferent language groups.29
A variant of the territorial model of language policy is adopted in 
Spain. The Castilian language has been the dominant language in Spain 
for centuries while other national languages were suppressed.30 The 
1978 Constitution made Castilian the official language of the central 
government, statewide, while making languages of the autonomous 
communities co-officials in their respective communities. It further 
imposes a duty on all citizens of Spain to learn Castilian and the right 
to use it. This limits the use of local languages to the activities of the 
autonomous communities thus, unlike the Canadian Constitution, 
denying any official status in relation to central institutions such as the 
government, congress, the administration and the courts. Although 
26 R Watts ‘Language policies and education in Switzerland’ in R Watts & J Smolicz 
(eds) Cultural democracy and ethnic pluralism: Multi-cultural and multi-lingual 
policies in education (1997) 271-30. See also F Grin ‘Language policy in multi-lingual 
Switzerland: Overview and recent developments’ paper presented at the Cicle de 
confèrencies sobre política lingüística Direcció general de política lingüística, Barcelona, 
Spain, 4 December 1998.
27 J Steiner ‘Switzerland and the European Union: A puzzle’ in M Keating & J McGarry 
(eds) Minority nationalism and the changing international order (2001) 137-154.
28 Balmer (n 12 above) 443.
29 Fleiner (n 25 above) 103-145. 
30 Spain, after almost four decades of Franco’s highly-centralised and homogenising 
regime, adopted a new Constitution in 1978. During the Second Spanish Republic 
(1931-1938), which was considered by many as a progressive government, Catalonia, 
the Basque country and Galicia were allowed to enjoy some level of autonomy. This 
was, however, short-lived. The Franco regime, which came to power in 1936, empha-
sised unity and condemned all forms of cultural diversity. The regime suppressed all 
regional political institutions and laws. It also prohibited the use of Catalans and 
Basques (Euskera) languages and all sorts of symbolic elements (flags, anthems) 
of the Catalan and Basque identities. See M Guibernau ‘Between autonomy and 
secession: The accommodation of minority nationalism in Catalonia’ in A Gagnon et 
al (eds) The conditions for diversity in multi-national democracies (2004) 122.
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the sanction of the Castilian language as co-officials of the autonomous 
communities have played an important role in promoting national 
unity, it also has the adverse effect of further entrenching the dispro-
portionate status the local language holds in its own area. As noted by 
Agranoff, ‘the language issue has created the single most protracted 
policy conflict’ in Spain.31
3 Comparing language rights regimes in South 
Africa and Ethiopia
Against the backdrop of the brief comparative observations provided 
above, the article proceeds to examine the language rights regime 
both in South Africa and Ethiopia. It commences to do so by looking at 
South Africa.
3.1 The South African experience
Section 6 of the South African Constitution regulates the use of lan-
guage. It determines the official language of the Republic as well as the 
provinces and municipalities. Like the interim Constitution, section 6 
of the Constitution recognises 11 languages as the official languages of 
the Republic. The conferring of official status on all 11 languages sends 
the message that all linguistic groups are regarded equal by the South 
African Constitution. Symbolically, it reinforces the normative guide set 
by the Preamble that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it’.32
Section 6 of the Constitution departs from its counterpart in the 
interim Constitution in important ways. First, the stipulation of the 
interim Constitution which mandated the government to ‘create con-
ditions for the equal use and enjoyment’ of all official languages is, to 
some extent, qualified in the 1996 Constitution by the introduction of a 
preferential treatment clause that applies in relation to some of the offi-
cial languages. The Constitution, under section 6(2), emphasises ‘the 
historically diminished use and status of the indigenous languages’ and 
mandates the government to ‘take practical and positive measures to 
elevate the status and advance the use of these languages’. The special 
treatment afforded to previously marginalised indigenous languages 
is further entrenched in the Constitution as it, under section 6(4)(2), 
subjects the enjoyment of ‘parity of esteem and equitable treatment’ 
31 R Agranoff ‘Asymmetrical and symmetrical federalism in Spain: An examination of 
intergovernmental policy’ in De Villiers (n 22 above) 73. 
32 Another language-related clause of the Constitution, though individualistic in its ori-
entation, is sec 9(3) which states that ‘the state may not unfairly discriminate directly 
or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including … language’. In 
addition, sec 30 provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to use the language and 
participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may 
do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights’.
of all official languages to ‘the state’s obligation with regard to indig-
enous languages’. Obviously, ‘equitable treatment’ in this context 
does not mean equal treatment. As Currie aptly notes, it is ‘a treatment 
that is just and fair in the circumstances’.33 This, at least, means that 
a language policy has to take into account the structural inequalities 
of the different languages spoken in the country, entailing a special 
treatment of some of the official languages.
The special treatment of previously marginalised indigenous lan-
guages is even symbolically expressed in the manner in which the 11 
official languages are listed in section 6(1). Unlike in the interim Consti-
tution, in which the official languages are listed alphabetically, the 1996 
Constitution, under section 6(1), lists the 11 official languages, start-
ing with the language that lacks widespread usage and ending with 
the one that enjoys extensive usage.34 In other words, usage informs 
the listing order of the 11 official languages. This symbolic expression 
can, in fact, serve as a guide for interpretation. Strydom argued that 
‘[t]he purpose of the structure is to change the order preference in 
a deliberate attempt to give textual prominence to languages lacking 
widespread usage’.35
Second, the language clause of the 1996 Constitution introduces a 
plethora of considerations that were not included in the interim Consti-
tution and which must now be taken into account when the different 
spheres of government decide their official languages.36 The newly 
added considerations are usage, practicality, expense, regional circum-
stances, and balancing the needs and preferences of the population. 
A third point of departure is that the interim Constitution stipulation, 
which prohibited the downgrading of rights relating to languages and 
the status of languages existing at the commencement of the interim 
Constitution, is omitted. That specific clause was of special concern 
to the Afrikaner community who feared the marginalisation of their 
language in post-apartheid South Africa.
3.1.1 For the purposes of government
The use of language for the purposes of government is a major mani-
festation of the officialisation of a language.37 According to section 6(3), 
33 I Currie ‘Official languages’ in M Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa (2002) 37.1-37.15.
34 HA Strydom ‘Minority rights issues in post-apartheid South Africa’ (1997) 19 Loyola 
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 873-914. 
35 Strydom (n 34 above) 898.
36 As above.
37 As aptly argued by Strydom, ‘officialising a language is meaningless unless that 
language is used in all or most of the primary tasks of government — legislative, 
executive and judicial’; HA Strydom International standards for the protection of 
minorities and the South African Constitution http://www.fwdklerk.org.za/down-
load_docs/02_05_Int_Standard_Minorities_Publ_PDF.pdf (accessed 20 March 
2007).
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which outlines the use of language for the purposes of government, 
the national and provincial governments can select any of the official 
languages for the purposes of their administration. It mandates both 
national and provincial governments to consider the factors listed in sec-
tion 6(3) and to adopt at least two official languages for the purposes of 
government.38 Their decision to use any of the official languages must 
be based on ‘usage, practicality, expense, regional circumstances and 
the balances of the needs and preferences of the population as a whole 
or in the province concerned’.39 In this regard, local governments are 
spared from the complexities of these considerations as they are only 
required to take into account language usage and the preferences of 
their residents. The subsection injects a minimum condition by enjoin-
ing the national government and each provincial government to use 
at least two official languages.40 In South Africa, where the different 
ethnic groups are relatively geographically concentrated, the regional 
preference to language usage provides ample opportunity to promote 
regional languages and to facilitate the promotion of self-management 
of ethnic communities.
The 1996 Constitution also maintained the Pan-South African 
Language Board which was established by the interim Constitution. 
As stated in the interim Constitution, the Board is mandated to pro-
mote and create conditions for the development and use of all official 
languages.41 The list of languages which the Board is mandated to 
promote and develop is, however, amended to include the Khoi, Nama 
and San languages, as well as sign languages.42 In addition, the Board 
is entrusted with the additional task of promoting and ensuring respect 
for all languages commonly used by communities in South Africa, 
including German, Greek, Gujarati, Hindi, Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu 
and Urdu.43 This duty of the Board is also extended to languages used 
for religious purposes in South Africa, including Arabic, Hebrew, San-
skrit and other languages.44 The 1999 South African Language Board 
Amendments Act added the responsibility of preparing a dictionary for 
all 11 official languages.
38 It is not, however, clear if this variant of territorial model automatically applies to 
national departments operating in the provinces. 
39 Sec 6(3) South African Constitution.
40 According to one interpretation, the minimum number of languages to be used 
for purposes of government is three and not two: English and Afrikaans (as the 
spirit of the Constitution precludes that their status be diminished) plus at least 
one African language because the state must, in terms of sec 6(2), take practical 
positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these languages. M 
Kriel ‘Approaches to multi-lingualism in language planning and identity politics — A 
critique’ http://general.rau.ac.za/sociology/kriel.pdf (accessed 20 March 2006).
41 Sec 6(5) South African Constitution.
42 Sec 6(5)(a) South African Constitution. 
43 Secs 6(5)(b)(i) South African Constitution.
44 Sec 6(5)(b)(ii) South African Constitution.
The conferring of official status to all 11 languages is criticised by 
some as counterproductive. They argue that this policy is not practically 
realisable and may eventually result in unilingualism; they consider the 
policy as ‘impractical egalitarianism’.45 This fear is compounded by 
the fact that the Constitution, as mentioned earlier, subjects the equal 
treatment and use of all 11 languages to a plethora of practical consider-
ations. Although scholars like Alexander concede to the unavoidability 
of the use of such ‘safety clauses’, he strongly warns that clauses which 
are ‘allegedly based on technical and economic grounds, are more 
usually the perfect loopholes for reducing the principle of equal treat-
ment to mere lip service’.46
3.1.2 Assessment
The official recognition of all 11 languages as equal at the national level 
could be considered as a reflection of a state that emphasises national 
unity by assuring that all language groups have a place in South Africa, 
while the regional preferences in language usage represent a recogni-
tion of the need to provide for regional languages. Theoretically, the 
Constitution introduces a variant of the territorial model of language 
planning at a provincial level. Unlike the traditional territorial model, 
however, it does not simply grant an official status to the language of 
the majority of the locality and limit the use of other local languages. 
It rather allows provincial governments to consider the factors listed in 
section 6(3) from a provincial context and to adopt at least two official 
languages for the purposes of provincial government.47 The province 
of the Western Cape, which is predominantly inhabited by Afrikaans 
and Xhosa speakers, has, for example, adopted three official languages: 
Afrikaans, isiXhosa and English. The decision not to advance one par-
ticular language but to, at least, recognise two official languages at the 
provincial level is an important recognition of intra-provincial diversi-
ties. Yet, this same aspect of the provincial language policy portrays 
a state that discourages the identification of a single language with a 
particular territory and promotes social cohesion and national unity 
through its language policy. The language clause of the Constitution 
has thus the dual role of promoting national unity and accommodat-
ing ethnic diversity.
It is, however, important to note that a reading of section 6(3) 
does not reveal which of the considerations listed therein should be 
given paramount importance when determining an official language. 
In the absence of such clear guidance, it all depends on the level of 
45 V Sacks ‘Multi-culturalism, constitutionalism and the South African Constitution’ 
(1997) SA Public Law 683.
46 N Alexander ‘Language and the national question’ in W James & G Maharaj (eds) 
South Africa: Between unity and diversity (1998) 16.
47 It is not, however, clear if this variant of territorial model automatically applies to 
national departments operating in the provinces.
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importance that policy makers attach to these determining factors. For 
those that stress practical and economic considerations, the official 
multilingualism policy serves no purpose beyond ‘a symbolic gesture’. 
A recommendation by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in June 
2000 suggested that Afrikaans be abolished and English becomes the 
sole medium of communication, training and examination. The Insti-
tute’s annual expenditure of R600 000 on translation, reproduction and 
printing is cited as the main reason behind the recommendation.48 
From the perspective of ethnic accommodation, on the other hand, 
practical considerations should not be used as an excuse to trample 
on the constitutionally-sanctioned official multi-lingualism. This per-
spective underemphasises the considerations of ‘practicality … and 
expense’ in the use of official languages. It rather stresses the impor-
tance of the constitutionally declared official multi-lingualism and the 
normative guidelines that declare the enjoyment of ‘parity of esteem 
and equitable treatment of all official languages’.49
In practice, government seems to have given considerable weight to 
practical considerations. English has become the lingua franca of gov-
ernment administration to the extent that the policy of multi-lingualism 
adopted by the Constitution has only come to represent a mere sym-
bolic value. English has become the language for internal and external 
communication in government departments.50 Even when members 
of the public communicate with government in a language other than 
English, government departments invariably respond in English.51 
Both in the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, 
the dominance of English is clear. Major policy documents are often 
produced only in English. The situation is no different in the courts. 
The constitutional promises relating to the parity of 11 languages are 
not given effect to.52
48 Kriel (n 40 above). 
49 LT du Plessis & JL Pretorius ‘The structure of the official language clause: A frame-
work for its implementation’ (2000) 15 SA Public Law 505-526.
50 Very recently, the decision of the Western Cape Provincial Police Department that 
only English be used for all internal, including radio, communication has faced 
protest from a group Afrikaans-speaking police and also among the wider Afrikaans-
speaking community. Some threatened legal action against the province’s police 
language policy. The authorities said that their aim was to improve communica-
tion between the province’s different language groups by encouraging the use 
of English. The new policy was later removed; See News24.Com ‘FW: Afrikaans is 
under threat’ http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,9294,2-7-
1442_2060508,00.html (accessed 20 March 2007). 
51 Strydom (n 34 above).
52 After examining the use of African languages in courts, Hlophe (2001:94) concluded 
that ‘[t]he courts continue to lay too much emphasis on practical considerations. Prac-
tical considerations in effect are convenience to the presiding judicial officer! The noble 
goal of language parity will remain elusive as long as the courts continue to adopt this 
approach, and the legacy of English and Afrikaans as the sole court language will 
continue … In the result, indigenous African languages are undermined.’ JM Hlophe 
‘Official languages and the courts’ (2001) 11 South African Law Journal 690-696. 
The establishment of the Pan-South African Language Board has 
not, as yet, had any significant impact on ensuring the implementa-
tion of the official language clause. On many occasions, the Board, 
after investigating complaints with regard to the violation of language 
rights, has found that the language policies and practices of the gov-
ernment and state corporations violate the Constitution. The findings 
and recommendations of the Board, however, often fall on deaf ears. 
The government is broadly criticised for failing to give adequate atten-
tion to the Board. On one occasion, the Board felt compelled to write 
an open letter to President Nelson Mandela criticising and expressing 
its concern about the tendency towards monolingualism at all levels of 
government.53
Generally, the discussion on the use of language for the purposes of 
government reveals a trend that reinforces the suspicion of the critics 
of the officialisation of all 11 languages. The officialisation of the 11 lan-
guages might send the symbolic message that all groups are regarded 
equally in the public sphere. However, this symbolic message has not 
been given practical effect. Despite the multi-lingual reality that char-
acterises South African society and a Constitution that declares official 
multi-lingualism, monolingualsim seems to be the emerging trend.54
3.2 Ethiopia’s experience
Article 5 of the Ethiopian Constitution, outlining the basic principle of 
the language policy, declares that all Ethiopian languages shall enjoy 
equal state recognition. This is further elaborated by article 39 of the 
Constitution, which states that every ethnic group in Ethiopia ‘has the 
right to speak, to write, and to develop its own languages; to express, 
to develop and to promote its culture; to preserve its history’. Based on 
these constitutional principles, the Constitution declares that Amharic 
shall be the working language of the federal government while allow-
53 H Giliomee ‘The rise and possible demise of Afrikaans language’ PRASEA Occasional 
Papers 14 (2003). 
54 The practice of monolingualism with its promotion of English as the sole language 
of communication has caused an outcry from communities, especially the Afrikaner 
community. In an open letter addressed to President Thabo Mbeki, 24 prominent 
speakers of Afrikaans complained that ‘the South African government’s commitment 
to a philosophy of multi-lingualism and cultural pluralism was paying lip service 
only, as was the commitment to the promotion of the African languages, including 
Afrikaans’ Insig 1999:24. English, they claimed, is what is actually being promoted. 
The dominance of English is, in fact, conceded by the government. The Minister 
of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, when establishing a Language Plan Task 
Group, noted the increasing tendency towards unilingualism despite the multi-lin-
gual reality that characterises South African society and a Constitution that declares 
official multi-lingualism. See Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology 
‘Towards a national language plan for South Africa’ Final Report of the Language Plan 
Task Group http://www.dacst.gov.za/arts_culture/language/ langplan/contents.htm 
(1996) (accessed 20 April 2006).
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ing the states to determine their respective working language.55 The 
federal offices that operate in the states employ Amharic as the lan-
guage of communication.
From the outset, it is important to note that the Constitution, faced 
with an ocean of linguistic diversity, has opted not to adopt an official 
language or languages. It has rather opted for a ‘working language’. 
Symbolically, this is obviously designed to avoid the impression that a 
particular language is favoured above any other at the symbolic level. 
The Ethiopian system adopted Amharic as the language of government 
(federal) business without conveying the message that the adopted 
language is dominant over others. The success of the system in over-
coming the dilemma that it tries to circumvent is, of course, something 
that can be debated. As we shall see in the following paragraphs, 
there are sections of society that regard the continued use of Amharic 
at the federal level as a continuation of their marginalisation and the 
perpetuation of past policies that subordinated all other languages to 
Amharic.
The constitutional stipulation that allows each regional state to adopt 
its working language opens a room for the application of a territorial 
model of language planning, in which case the working language of each 
member of the federation would be that of the majority of the area.56 
In practice, five of the nine regional states have endorsed unilingual-
ism. This obviously provides ample room for each ethnic community to 
develop its language and culture. It also represents recognition of the 
linguistic identities of the constituent units. An important consequence 
of this policy is that individuals moving into either of these regions 
must assimilate. That means that Amharic-speaking citizens moving to 
an Oromifa-speaking region have to leave behind any prior claim to 
language protection. As we shall see later, this has created a problem in 
some areas where an important number of minorities are scattered in 
the midst of regionally-dominant linguistic groups, especially in major 
urban areas of some of the member states. It is, however, important 
to note that the ethnically plural regional states have opted to retain 
Amharic as their working language. To be precise, three of the four 
multi-ethnic states (ie the SNNPR, Benishangul and Gambela regional 
states) have decided to retain Amharic as their working language.
3.2.1 Debate on language policy
This language policy has provoked criticism both from centrifugal and 
centripetal forces. On the one hand, there are sections of society that 
regard the adoption of Amharic as the working language of the federal 
government as ‘little more than the continued endorsement of the 
superior position of the language, and the sections of society associated 
55 Art 5 Ethiopian Constitution.
56 The state-based federal offices use Amharic for government business.
with it, by the Ethiopian state’.57 For these sections of society, the policy 
is a threat to their ethnic self-determination rights.58 It also undermines 
the constitutional principle that all languages are equal.59 The Oromo 
Federal Democratic Movement, for example, has opposed the sole 
use of Amharic as the working language of the federal government 
and calls for the adoption of Oromifa as the working language of the 
federal government.60
The more vocal criticism comes from the proponents of the idea of 
Ethiopian nationhood who want to use language as a unifying fac-
tor. They criticise the position of the Constitution on language as an 
attempt to create ‘the biblical tower of Babel’ in Ethiopia. If that was not 
the intention, they argue, the drafters of the Constitution would have 
opted to encourage the use of Amharic, ultimately developing it as the 
national language.61 According to this argument, Amharic could serve 
‘as an important instrument for the eventual creation of greater cohe-
sion among Ethiopians in language and in a sense of common national 
destiny as one people’.62 The case of India is often invoked to support 
this line of argument. Haile-Selassie remarks that ‘the role of English as 
a common language among the diverse linguistic groups in India has 
tremendously assisted in the development of a national consciousness 
in that country’.63 The proponents of this view recommend the Rus-
sian and Spanish model of language planning, where the Russian and 
Castilian languages are respectively used along the languages of the 
constituent units.64 It is similarly contended that non-Amharas, owing 
to the decreased amount of formal education they receive as a result of 
57 G Cohen ‘Identity and opportunity: The implications of using local languages in 
the primary education system of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s 
Regional State (SNNPR), Ethiopia’ unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London, 
School of Oriental and African Studies, 2000 111. 
58 L Smith ‘Language choice, ethnic self-determination and national unity in contem-
porary Ethiopia’ paper presented at a panel discussion on ‘Ethnicity, identity and the 
right to self-determination’ 26 May 2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
59 B Haile-Selassie ‘Ethiopia: A precarious ethno-federal constitutional order’ unpub-
lished doctoral thesis, University of Wisconsin Law School, 2002.
60 Interview with Bulcha Demekesa, Chairperson of the Oromo Federalist Democratic 
Movement (OFDM) http://www.oduu.com/news/index.php?news_id=4 (accessed 
25 February 2009).
61 M Haile ‘The new Ethiopian Constitution: Its impact upon unity, human rights and 
development’ (1996) 20 Suffolk Trans-National Law Review 1-84.
62 Minase (n 61 above) 37. Ehrlich similarly argues that the language policy has the 
effect of ‘causing a degree of separation between the various groups’. C Ehrlich 
‘Ethnicity and constitutional reform: The case of Ethiopia’ (1999) 6 ILSA Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 51-73. 
63 Haile-Selassie (n 59 above) 213.
64 As above.
LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ETHIOPIA 517
518 (2009) 9 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
the language policy, will effectively lose access to the state apparatus, 
further disconnecting them from a sense of Ethiopian identity.65
3.2.2 Assessment
The position of the Constitution on the use of language marks a clean 
break with the past during which Amharic enjoyed a superior position 
throughout the country. This is a major departure from the historical 
pattern in which ‘the distribution of the political goods of communica-
tion, recognition and autonomy has been highly skewed, benefiting 
native Amharic-speakers disproportionately’.66 Of course, the special 
place of Amharic in the Ethiopian linguistic landscape has not vanished 
entirely. It is also true that the retention of Amharic as the language of 
national communication can appear to some as the continuation of 
the Amharic hegemony. However, even if one cannot deny the sym-
bolic implications of the retention of Amharic as a federal language, 
its continued use can hardly be associated with deliberate symbolic 
dominance. The decision to keep Amharic as the federal working lan-
guage is no more than a reflection of the position that the language 
has attained as ‘an effective means of national communication’.67 This 
is also evident from the fact that it is not labelled as an official but rather 
as a working language of the federal government.
Using Amharic along with the regional languages as co-official lan-
guage in all regional states might, as some argue, help to promote the 
relationship between the different linguistic groups. This view, how-
ever, belies the structural imbalance that exists between Amharic and 
the other languages and the effect that this imbalance may have on the 
development of the latter. As indicated in previous sections, Amharic, 
to the exclusion of all other languages, has been the language of gov-
ernment business for decades. This provides Amharic with a unique 
position in terms of language status, which other languages would 
be hard-pressed to compete with. Even in states where the speakers 
of other languages are in the majority, there is no guarantee that a 
policy of co-official languages will manage to avoid the dominance 
65 Ehrlich (n 62 above). Bloor & Tamrat share the same concern. It is often argued that 
the present language policy in Ethiopia ‘will restrict movement across administrative 
units, thereby disrupting existing patterns of exchange between different areas and 
contact between different people’. T Bloor & W Tamrat ‘Issues in Ethiopian language 
policy and education’ (1996) 17 Journal of Multi-lingual and Multi-cultural Develop-
ment 321-338. See also Cohen (n 57 above) 112.
66 Smith (n 58 above) 5. As pointed out by Fasil, ‘state recognition of every Ethiopian 
language means that efforts for its development — ie the preservation of literature, 
the provision for a script, where such does not exist; the documentation of its oral 
literature; and the further study of each language via grammatical, vocabulary and 
overall publication and enhanced use of the language — will be done with both state 
blessing and state support to the extent possible’. F Nahum Constitution for a nation 
of nations (1997) 55.
67 Cohen (n 57 above) 111.
of the Amharic language. Without, at least, some kind of ‘normalisa-
tion of language policy’, the regional language will in all likelihood be 
relegated to a secondary status.
Moreover, even if one accepts the instrumentality of the Amharic 
language in bringing different ethnic communities together, it is not 
clear if it has to be given an official status both at the federal and state 
level. As noted above, Amharic is now the working language of the 
federal government in which all government business is conducted. 
Obviously, any communication between the federal government and 
a member state or between two member states will be conducted in 
Amharic. Furthermore, with the view to promote the language as the 
language of national communication, Amharic is being provided as a 
subject in almost all primary schools throughout the country. It is also 
important to note that almost all ethnically plural regional states, with 
the sole exception of Harari, have opted for Amharic as their working 
language. Generally, Amharic is still given precedence over all other 
languages.68 This means Amharic can still serve as a cohesive force by 
facilitating communication between and among the different ethnic 
groups.
It is also not clear if those like Haile-Selassie that criticise the pres-
ent language system based on the Indian model have really grasped 
the Indian system. Their criticism rather reflects an incorrect apprecia-
tion of the Indian system. It is true that the adoption of English as a 
language of government business (ie associate additional official 
language) has facilitated communication between the different ethnic 
groups in India. Underlying the Indian and, as a matter of fact, some 
African states’ decision to adopt English as their official language, is 
the very fact that English has a unique neutral status compared to that 
of other local languages. It is this factor that often motivates the use 
of English and not other local languages as languages of government 
business. As Schmied observes, this is specifically true in most decolo-
nised states:69
Ethnic languages are normally not accepted as national languages wherever 
other groups fear ‘tribal dominance’ and prefer English, which is ‘tribally 
neutral’. Only tribally neutral lingue franche have any chance of taking over 
certain functions from English as national languages.
The decision made by India not to adopt Hindu as a ‘working language’ 
of the national government was underlined by the fact that the adoption 
of Hindu would portray the dominance of the Hindu-speaking group 
and the relegation of others to a secondary status. It is also important 
68 What might even be problematic is the dominance of Amharic in the majority of 
the ethnically-plural regional states. This, one may argue, works against the consti-
tutional commitment to promote linguistic diversity and especially the use of local 
languages even though the scheme benefits from the culturally neutral status of 
Amharic in the context of the regional languages.
69 J Schmied English in Africa: An introduction (1991) 27. 
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to note that the Indian system recognises 22 state languages. Thus, in 
addition to allowing the constituent units to adopt their own regional 
languages, the adoption of the Indian model would have resulted in the 
‘officialisation’ of a ‘culturally neutral language’. Amharic, obviously, 
does not enjoy a neutral status among the different ethnic groups in 
Ethiopia. Yet, despite this fact, a decision has been made to maintain 
Amharic as the federal working language. Furthermore, as indicated 
earlier, it is regarded as the language of national communication and, 
as a result, it is being taught as a subject in primary schools in non-
Amharic speaking parts of the country. Generally, if the suggestion for 
the Ethiopian system is to emulate the Indian model, one can reason-
ably argue that the present system provides more than what the Indian 
system has to offer.
Finally, we turn to the argument that non-Amharic speakers will lose 
access to the state apparatus as a result of the language policy. It is not 
at all clear how the language policy will have the effect of compromis-
ing the capacity of individuals from a non-Amharic-speaking group to 
access the state, thereby continuing their historical marginalisation. 
In fact, the reverse seems to be true in present-day Ethiopia. Regional 
state government as well as administrative units within each regional 
state are run and staffed by members of the language group that is 
dominant in the regional or sub-regional government unit. The new 
dispensation has opened more opportunities for employment ‘to sons 
of the soil’. As we shall see later, this is also the case at the federal level. 
More than ever, one can easily observe the appointment of individuals 
from extremely diverse linguistic background in the different institu-
tions of the national government, including the cabinet. In fact, fluency 
in Amharic does not seem to be an obstacle in assuming higher offices 
of the federal government. It is not uncommon to come across Minis-
ters for whom Amharic obviously is clearly not their mother tongue.
4 Towards an inclusive language rights regime
A language rights regime that operates within the context of a multi-
ethnic federation should represent a recognition of the linguistic 
identities of the constituent units. This entails the framing of the lan-
guage rights regime as a concrete expression of the federalist principle 
and attempting to achieve a delicate balance between unity and diversi-
ty.70 It involves the adoption of a language policy that enables cultural 
communities to promote their language and cultural identity while at 
the same time promoting inter-ethnic solidarity.71 In this regard, the 
recognition of all languages as equal is an imperative element of any 
state that seeks to recognise ethnic diversity. Beyond that, however, 
70 Coulombe (n 1 above) 242.
71 Balmer (n 12 above) 447.
there is no definite answer on determining the official language(s) of 
the federal as well as subnational governments.
In terms of the federal language, the options are either to promote 
particular language(s) or, as in the case of South Africa, regard all lan-
guages spoken by the different ethnic groups as official languages of 
the country. The South African option is obviously viable in a country 
with few linguistic groups. As it is evident from the South African expe-
rience, a country with more than at least ten ethnic groups cannot, 
for example, expect to practically realise the usage of all languages in 
all or most business of the federal government. Such kind of policy, 
as again proved by the experience of South Africa, is an ‘impractical 
egalitarianism’.72 Despite the multilingual reality that characterises 
South African society and a Constitution that declares official multi-
lingualism, monolingualism is the emerging trend. This shows that the 
South African approach will result, more often than not, in a situation 
where a particular language becomes the ‘unofficial official language’ 
of the state. In that case, a mere recognition of all the languages spoken 
in the country as official languages will only have a symbolic value. In 
addition, the policy is bound to create discontent among some ethnic 
groups unless the ‘unofficially official language’ is a culturally neutral 
language, as English is for most South Africans73 and decolonised 
states. This is also the only situation where a state can adopt a particu-
lar language as official language without provoking a hostile reaction 
from other ethnic groups.
Adopting a national language remains, however, a challenge in 
states such as Ethiopia that do not have the benefit of a culturally 
neutral language. One option in this context is to select a particular 
language, which in most cases would be the historically dominant lan-
guage, as the language of government business without bestowing it 
with the status of an official language. The Ethiopian approach which 
recognises Amharic as the working language represents this option. 
This approach seemingly contrasts with the South African model that 
recognises all languages as official languages. Like the South African 
model, however, it is underlined by the same principle that recognises 
all linguistic groups as equal. The difference lies in the way the two 
systems give expression to this same principle.
Under the working language approach, the selected language will 
become the working languages of the federal government in which 
all tasks of government are conducted. Of course, as in the case of 
the use of Amharic in Ethiopia, the symbolic implication of adopting 
72 Sacks (n 45 above) 683.
73 This, of course, is not true for Afrikaners for whom issues relating to language 
historically constitute a central place in their resistance against the British cultural 
hegemony. This partly explains why the Afrikaners, unlike the other ethnic groups 
in South Africa, feel so strongly about the dominance of English in today’s South 
Africa.
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a particular language or retaining a historically dominant language 
as the working language of the federal government cannot be easily 
disregarded. The solution lies in convincing the different ethnic groups 
that the particular language, as the title suggests, is adopted not to 
reflect the hegemony of the speakers of that language, but because 
of the special position that the language has attained as an effective 
means of national communication. This, however, only becomes prac-
ticable when the state demonstrates its commitment to the equality of 
all languages by adopting some form of territorial model of language 
planning, expressing regional preferences in language usage.
Unless in a bi-ethnic state where the individual model, which allows 
citizens to use their language in every part of the country, can serve 
the same purpose, the territorial approach to language, whereby each 
region adopts its language(s), is the language planning model that 
seems to provide effective institutional reality to the act of recognition. 
Under this model, the subnational units are allowed to adopt regional 
language(s). This does not necessarily mean promoting unilingualism. 
As is the case in South Africa, sub-national states that are inhabited 
by more than one ethnic group can, to the extent possible, recogn-
ise intra-substate linguistic diversities by recognising more than one 
language as working languages of the sub-national government. This 
would not only represent recognition of intra-substate diversities, but 
also portray a state that promotes social cohesion and national unity by 
avoiding the association of a particular territory with a single language. 
This option may not, however, be appropriate in a situation where a 
sub-national state is composed of, for example, not less than five eth-
nic groups. As the experience of ethnically plural sub-national units 
that adopted Amharic as their working language in Ethiopia suggests, 
adopting a language that is culturally neutral in the context of the 
relevant sub-national state is often the only way out. Yet, the system 
can be used to allow each sub-national state to use its institutional and 
territorial structure to reflect its linguistic diversity.
Related to this is whether sub-national units should adopt the 
national official/working language as co-official at the sub-national 
level. Of course, adopting the national language as co-official pro-
motes social cohesion, especially in countries where there is extensive 
movement of citizens across internal borders. However, subscribing 
to this view does not necessarily require the co-officialisation of the 
national language. The idea of using language as a method of social 
cohesion can be promoted, for example, by ensuring that children, as 
in the case of Ethiopia, learn the federal language as a subject in their 
primary education. The argument for co-officialisation of the federal 
language at the regional level can have currency only in a situation like 
in Ethiopia where there are a large number of geographically dispersed 
ethnic migrants, especially in urban areas, who would be disadvan-
taged when government business is conducted in the language of the 
regionally empowered group.
The co-official language policy is not, however, without problems. 
The problem with this policy is that it has the tendency to promote the 
hegemonic status that a historically privileged language group enjoys. 
This is clearly the case in Ethiopia where the adoption of Amharic as 
co-official language at the regional level would have the effect of main-
taining the historically dominant position of that language with the 
regional language in all likelihood occupying a disproportionate place. 
This is also supported by the experience of Quebec in Canada where 
the co-official policy perpetuated the dominant position of English, 
necessitating the province to embark on what is called ‘the language 
normalisation process’. In a country where the designated federal lan-
guage is not culturally neutral and where the nationally designated 
language is a historically dominant language, the co-official policy at 
the regional level is thus likely to perpetuate the dominant position that 
the latter enjoys in a state. Without state intervention, the historically 
dominant language will continue to remain as the majority language 
status relegating the regional language, albeit numerically dominant, 
to a secondary level.
In a sub-national state where there are large numbers of ethnic 
migrants, however, the adoption of the co-official policy seems unavoid-
able if the system is to accommodate ethnic diversity. The dangers that 
the co-official policy might pose on the status of the regional language 
can be mitigated by allowing the sub-national state to adopt what is 
called ‘the language normalisation processes’. As the experience of 
Quebec in Canada shows, the basic aim of these processes is to restore 
and maintain the majority status that local languages should assume 
in their localities. As the experience of Ethiopia suggests, in a country 
like Ethiopia where there are a large number of ethnic migrants, the 
absence of a co-official policy easily causes strain on inter-ethnic rela-
tionships and runs the risk of alienating particular ethnic groups.
In conclusion, it is true that the success of a federal arrangement 
in accommodating ethnic diversity cannot be measured solely on the 
basis of its language rights regime. It is, however, generally agreed that 
a well-designed language policy goes a long way in contributing either 
to the effective reconciliation of unity and diversity or to the eventual 
polarisation of cultural communities and further disintegration of the 
state.
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